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THE EFFECT OF TRANSACTIONS COSTS ON
THE MARKET FOR BABIES
Margaret F. Brinig*
L

Introduction

Among the more controversial ideas advanced by prominent
United States Circuit Court Judge and law professor Richard Posner is his suggestion that a market in babies would rectify many of
the problems of the adoption system.' His concept has, to say the
least, provoked a tremendous reaction in various segments of
American society.' His critics proclaimed that sales of children
would serve to demean the children and their mothers, relegating
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. B.A., Duke University, 1970; J.D.,
Seton Hall University School of Law, 1973; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University, 1994. I wish to thank Bryan Beier and Carol Simpson for their research assistance
on this article.
1 The original paper was co-authored by Elizabeth Landes. Elizabeth Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
Posner has also written specifically regarding the adoption market. See Richard A.
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1987) [hereinafter
Posner, Regulation]; as well as the various editions of his textbook, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW. See, e.g., RIcHAR D A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.3, at 139-44 (3d
ed. 1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.4, at 149-54 (4th ed.
1992) [hereinafter POSNER, 4th ed.].
2 See, e.g.,JohnJ. Donohue III& Ian Ayres, Posner'sSymphony No. 3: Thinking About
the Unthinkable,39 STAN. L. Rxv. 791 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
LAW (3d ed.) (1986)); Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law and Markets:

ANALYSIS OF

A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-EconomicsDebate, 67 B.U. L. REv. 73 (1987);Jane
Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105 (1987); Tamar
Frankel & Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L.
REv. 99 (1987); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and the Ideology of
the Coase Theorem, 52 S.CAL. L. REv. 669, 688 n.51 (1979) (discussing the effect of the
black market in babies);J. Robert S. Prichard, A Marketfor Babies , 34 U. TORONTO L.J.
341 (1984); Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner,99
HARv. L. Rxv. 1449 (1986); Paul M. Barrett, Influential Ideas: A Movement Called 'Law
and Economics' Sways Legal Circles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, 16; Anne McDaniel,
Free-MarketJurist, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1985, at 93-94 (providing a brief biography of
Judge Posner at a time when it was rumored he was being considered for a position
on the United States Supreme Court); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 1449, 1486 n.198 (1992) (citing Lincoln Caplan, Meet RichardPosner,
TheJudge Who Would Sell Homeless Babies, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. ED., Oct. 29, 1984, at

23).

553

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:553

them to the status of mere commodities.3 Unscrupulous but
wealthy parents might purchase children solely to abuse them.4
"Baby-selling" became a code word for the foolish extreme to
which its proponents could carry law-and-economics. 5
The truth is that an adoption market already exists, however
distasteful that may seem.6 As Posner aptly described it, there is
already a regulated price for babies.' States have set the price so
low that the demand for adoptable infants vastly exceeds their supply.' Because of the discrepancy between supply and demand, a
black market has evolved in which the price is extremely high sim-

ply because baby selling is illegal. 9
Posner suggests that legalization of compensation would benefit most of the players in the adoption market, because the supply
Cohen, supra note 2, at 154-55; Frankel & Miller, supra note 2, at 100-01.
This was anticipated, and dismissed, by Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 343.
5 Donohue & Ayres, supra note 2, at 791-93 (analogizing the baby market and
rape portions of Posner's book to the erratic work produced by composer Franz
Liszt). The authors maintained that "Posner ... does not always manifest a proper
appreciation of such limits on economic analysis. Unfortunately, this shortcoming
may deter many from reading his otherwise valuable book or improperly discredit the
entire realm of law and economics." Id. at 793.
6 See, e.g., Cass, supra note 2, at 75-76, 85-90 (asserting the existence of a market
which enables American couples to buy babies from mothers in other countries as a
result of this country's domestic adoption restrictions); Prichard, supra note 2, at 34345 (reporting that black market prices for babies are increasing due to the perpetually intense interest of childless couples). Like Posner, I have previously written about
delicate subjects. See Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, Sex, Property Rights and
Divorce (Working Paper, 1994) (sexual intercourse during marriage); Margaret F.
Brinig, Rings and Promises,6J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 203 (1990) (breach of promise to marry and engagement rings); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Opportunism in Marriage,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 859 (forthcoming 1994) (spouse abuse).
7 Posner, Regulation, supra note 1, at 64-65, makes the observation that a "high
black market price [is] conjoined with an artificially low price for babies obtained
from adoption agencies and through lawful independent adoptions."
8 Id. at 65; Prichard, supra note 2, at 343. One commentator has reported that
between 20 and 40 couples may compete for every infant placed for adoption. Janet
Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 918 n.7 (1991) (citations omitted). Dickson discusses the
popular interest in adoption. Id. at 918 n.10. The wait before placement can take
from two to ten years. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACrBOOK 175
3
4

(1991) [hereinafter

ADOPTION FACTOOK].

See also Natalie Haag Wallisch, Note, In-

dependent Adoption; Regulating the Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 327-28 (1985)
(three to five years) (citations omitted).
9 For a detailed description of this market, see Margaret V. Turano, Comment,
Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976). See generally PETER REUTER, THE ORGANIZATION OF ILLEGAL MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1985); Prichard, supra note
2, at 343 (prices as high as $40,000 for newborns).
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of adoptable babies will increase given a legal market price. 10
Adoptive parents will acquire the children they so badly desire.
The suffering inherent in giving a child up for adoption will decrease since natural mothers will be compensated for bearing the
children."1 The market will provide incentives for the pregnant
women to take better care of themselves so the children will be
healthier." Arguably fewer women will terminate unplanned
pregnancies by abortion.' 3 Finally, the children will go to the parents who value them most.
Perhaps the greatest problem with Posner's market theory remains largely unexplored. Courts, legal theorists, and economists
invariably focus discussions about children upon the rights of the
related adults. While child custody statutes and decisions begin
with a "best interests of the child" standard,' 4 they end with choosing the interests of one parent or one set of parents.' 5 Sometimes
10 POSNER, 4th ed., supra note 1, at 152-53; Prichard, supra note 2, at 345.
11 Prichard, supra note 2, at 346 (at which the author puts forth the proposition
that financial incentives would cause women considering adoption to take better care
of the unborn child and would also cause them to be more careful in choosing sexual
partners); see also Cass, supra note 2, at 79-80 n.23 (where the author proposes that
financial incentives for placing children for adoption "do not seem inherently more
likely to regret the decision than women who make different choices"). Surrendering
a child causes great and prolonged grief to the birth parent. See Eva Y. Deykin et al.,
The PostadoptionExperience of SurrenderingParents,54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 271, 27880 (1984).
12 Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 329-30; Prichard, supra note 2, at 345-46.
13 Landes & Posner, supranote 1, at 329-30. See also Cass, supra note 2, at 79 (noting that women who are financially compensated for putting their children up for
adoption are not more likely to regret the decision than women who opt for other
alternatives).
14 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (1993); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332A
(1993); AR& CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1993); CAL. CtV. CODE § 4600(d) (West
1992); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979);
Robert F. Cochran, The Searchfor Guidance in Determiningthe Best Interests of the Child at
Divorce, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,ParentalPreference
and Child Custody, 80 CAL.L. REv. 615 (1992); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching
the Egg A Child-CenteredPerspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. Rxv. 1747 (1992);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (determining, inter alia, that a child
does not have a constitutionally protected right to a familial relationship with both
birth father and mother's husband); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)
(preference given to primary caretaker in custody dispute involving unmarried
couple).
15 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (in recognizing that nature does not generally
allow for "dual parenthood," Court upheld a California statute that created a presumption that a child born to a married woman while living with her husband, who is
not the natural father, is a child of the marriage. Thus the putative father has no
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judges and legal academic writers accomplish this sleight-of-hand
by presumption. 6 Other times the rationale is more explicit. 7
Frequently the child suffers.' 8
For example, although Posner briefly addresses concerns
about abusive adoptive parents' 9 and a potential oversupply of
older or handicapped children 20 that may result from implementation of his ideas, he concentrates his discussions on the benefits to
parents of a market price. Although the adoption market would
have many buyers and sellers, it would remain regulated by the
agencies screening adoptive parents. These institutions would reparental rights); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (proclaiming the illegality of
surrogacy contracts while recognizing the visitation rights of surrogate mother who
contracted with the natural father and his wife to give birth to the child). See also
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children'sPerspectives and the
Law, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 11 (1994) (advocating greater legal deference for the perspectives of children in those legal disputes that most significantly influence their lives).
16 See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117-19; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Settingin the Wake of Minnesota'sFour
Year Experiment with the Primay Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427 (1990).
17 See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The Court focused the issue before
them as follows:
Separated as our issue is from that of the future interests of the children,
we have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state, where
a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of
her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam.
Rights for more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if
she is to be bound....
Id. at 533.
18 See Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971) (ordering return of child to natural mother after she had
already surrendered the child for adoption because there was the existence of evidence that she lacked sufficient mental and emotional stability at the time of relinquishment as well as the fact that she sought revocation within three weeks of
surrender); Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1227.
19 Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 343.
20 POSNER, 4th ed., supra note 1, § 5.4, at 153; Posner, Regulation, supra note 1, at
65; Cass, supra note 2, at 75, 82; Cohen, supra note 2, at 169-71; Prichard, supranote 2,
at 354. Each of these authors discuss the problem briefly from the children's standpoint. Prichard, in particular, notes that:
[I] t can be argued that the purpose of the existing process is not to meet
the desires of childless couples for children, but rather to take care of a
limited number of unwanted newborns, with the merely incidental side
effect of bringing great joy and happiness to childless couples ....

The

success of the mechanism should therefore be judged in terms of the welfare of the unwanted newborns, not that of childless couples.
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duce the chance that parents would acquire children to abuse
them. 1 Agencies could also match birth and adoptive parents, reducing search costs for both parties to the transaction. 2
Although he is keenly aware of the costs of regulation in other
contexts, 23 Posner does not spend much time discussing the welfare losses caused by adoption agency regulation. These costs are
by no means unique to Posner's adoption market. They also represent part of what makes the current adoption system so frustrating.
In the current system, agencies rather than price act to ration the
scarce resource of adoptable children among the many potential
parents who want them. 4 In Posner's system, price would be the
primary mechanism for allocating children, and agencies would
serve a licensing function.
Although agencies serve to guard against abuse by adoptive
parents, they also increase transactions costs for both sets of parents. Agency investigations are not only expensive and annoying,
but they also greatly increase the time required for adoption.2 5 Because only the final order of adoption prevents the natural parents
from revoking consent,2 6 the six-month-minimum waiting period
adds uncertainty to the transaction.
The transaction costs added by legislatures to protect natural
Posner, supra note 1, at 66 (noting that child abuse laws apply with equal force
whether the child lives with natural or adoptive parents). Posner offers additional
argument to support his thesis that the establishment of a free market in the area of
adoption would serve to certify and investigate prospective "purchasers" who would
pay the price of the service. Prichard, supra note 2, at 353-54 (proposing a licensing
system for adoptive parents which would be based upon fitness criteria).
22 Prichard, supra note 2, at 346.
21

23 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &

MGrmr. ScG. 335 (1974) (discussing both the costs and various theories of regulation).
The various theories of economic regulation, including Posners', are further scrutinized in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAyS ON REGULATION 11445 (1975).
24 Agencies, therefore, prefer two parent homes, middle-aged couples (who have
relatively higher incomes), heterosexuals, and persons with conventional religious
practices. LisaJ. Trembly, Note, Untanglingthe Adoption Web: New Jersey's Move to Legitimize Independent Adoptions, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 372 (1993).
25 For example, Arlington County, Virgina, requires three home visits scheduled
over at least a six-month period after placement of the child in the adoptive home.
Virtually all states require visits before and during placement. ADOPTION FAcTBOOK,
supra note 8, at 22-33.
26 In some states, as will be discussed later, all consents may be revoked until the
final order. In most states, consents may be revoked prior to the final order in cases
of fraud and duress.
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parents' custodial rights and ensure suitability of adoptive couples
hurt more children than they assist. Virtually all couples trying to
adopt children are suitable." Because there is no real way to predict what kind of parents most childless couples will make, agencies
make both Type I (overinclusion) and Type II (underinclusion)
errors. As Posner was quick to note, we have no ex ante checks on
parents outside the adoption system.28
The reason for the miscalculation leading to agency involvement with adoption relates to the fundamental premise of this paper. As a society, we strongly presume that natural parents are the
best custodians for their children. 29 Others, by definition, are not
as qualified. Nonparents' motivations are questionable, and third
party experts may judge them. The emphasis on parental right to
custody is essential to the discussion. Here parents' rights, as opposed to the right of children in general to be raised by the best
custodian, are stressed. This principle has led courts and legislatures to second guess the parental consent for adoption.
Birth mothers are not allowed to give binding consent until
after children are born. 0 This universal rule seems wise in light of
the tremendous and overwhelming bonding between parent and
child that occurs at and shortly after childbirth."1 But even after
arrival of the child and a recovery period, courts scrutinize consent
to adoption more fervently than virtually any other transaction.
Looking at this judicial behavior charitably, natural parents placing
children will feel tremendous regret,3 2 a loss that Posner's compensation might alleviate at least in part. It is more likely, however,
that we allow revocation of this transaction despite unquestionable
27 ADoIriON FACTBOOK, supra note 8, at 22-33.
28 There are ex post checks if parents are unfit. Furthermore, newborns are occa-

sionally removed from homes where parents have abused older siblings.
29 Pennsylvania ex rel. Holland-Moritz v. Holschuh, 292 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1972); State
v. Meyers, 183 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. 1971); Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948);
Dickson, supra note 8, at 982 (where the author notes that "our system enshrines the
biological tie and assumes that children belong with their biological parents at almost
any cost").
30 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.3(C) (1) (Michie Supp. 1993) (birth child
must be at least 10 days old). See generally Susan Yates Ely, Natural Parents' Right to
Withdraw Consent to Adoption: How FarShould the Right Extend, 31 U. Loulsv.LE J. FAM.

L. 685 (1992-93) (further evaluating the concept of delayed revocation).
31 SeeJohnson v. Cupp, 274 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971).
32 See generally Deykin et al., supra note 11.
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harm to the promisee adoptive parents, 3 and frequently the child
as well. This situation is justified by the inordinate weight accorded parental rights. Although revocation does not happen in a
tremendous proportion of cases,3 4 the uncertainty it introduces
into the transaction is very significant.3 5 Uncertainty creates major
effects in the adoption market in much the same way that the very
market and
small risk of catastrophe dominates the insurance
36
power.
nuclear
about
thinking
many people's
This paper looks at the transactions costs imposed by parental
revocations and their effect on the current adoption market. The
focus, therefore, veers away from natural parental rights and moves
toward what is in most cases defacto, rather than preemptively, best
for children. Section II discusses parental rights to custody in a
variety of contexts. Section III presents parental rights to revoke
consent to adoption and shows how courts treat placement agreements differently from other contracts. Section IV discusses empirical tests of the model using state adoption data and an analysis of
33 See, e.g., Engstrom v. Iowa, 461 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1990). Engstrom involved a
situation where an adoption agency negligently told pre-adoptive parents that the natural father was dead when in fact he lived in California and wanted custody of the
child. The court, while ruling in favor of the birth parents, displayed its sympathy for
the pre-adoptive parents in acknowledging that "[t]he circumstances which led plaintiffs to commence this suit are, indeed, tragic." Id. at 320. See also Dickson, supra note
8, at 980-83 (acknowledging the "special need for finality" in adoption proceedings)
(citation omitted).
34 The exact proportion is unknown. See, e.g., ADOPTON FACTBOOK, supra note 8,
at 170 (citing a California television survey that placed the figure as high as 15%). See
also David K. Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act: Return to a Balanced View of Adoption, 19
FAM. L.Q. 141, 153 (1983) (less than two percent of California cases); Dickson, supra
note 8, at 967 n.258 (four percent of California cases).
35 Of course, the impact on the child may be devastating because of an infant's
need for stability. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 31-38. Dickson, supra note 8, at
977, notes that California courts have refused to set time limits for birth mothers to
decide whether or not to give their consent to an adoption. Said courts have, however, held that where adopting parents move to terminate the rights of a natural
mother who has not given consent, the grounds most typically employed is abandonment, which cannot be established until the mother and child have been separated
for at least six months.
36 For a discussion of this type of insurance, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue,
The First Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76
7
CORNELL L. REv. 126, 168 n.3 (1990) (citing Milton Friedman & L.R. Savage, A Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 290 (1948)); ROBERT JERRY,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 11-15 (1987); EJAN MACKAAY, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAw 173-74 (1982). For nuclear power, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 85-86 (1978).
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state revocation statutes. Section V broadens the discussion to include other ways in which transaction costs deflect consideration of
what is in children's best interests. There is also a brief discourse
on consent revocation in the context of more general enforcement
of promises.
ff.

ParentalRights to Custody

The fact that Posner and other students of adoption overlook
children's rights is hardly surprising, given the history of parental
supremacy. Cases involving child custody almost invariably invoke
the "best interest of the child" standard. 7 However, perhaps be-

cause the two contestants are parents or would-be parents, the
court considers their interests rather than those of the child.3 8 A
related reason for the focus on parental rights is the presumption,
irrebuttable except in the case of unfitness, that parents act in their
children's best interests. 3 9 Finally, to speak of "best interests" is
somewhat inappropriate. A more accurate standard is the placement that will cause the child the least harm-the "least detrimental alternative. "40 "Best interests" cannot always function because a

home with two loving parents is the best placement for childrenany other situation is always second best.

Until relatively modem times, children were the property of
their parents. Parents, and especially fathers, 4 made an initial de37 See, e.g. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (West 1981) ("welfare of the person to be
adopted shall be the paramount consideration"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 (1991)
("When the interests of a child and those of an adult are in conflict, such conflict
should be resolved in favor of the child"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989); UNIF. MARRiAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1979); Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Fact of Indeterminacy, 39:3 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226, 236 (1975).
38 Lawyers represent parents, although American Bar Association disciplinary regulations suggests they must act as advocates for children as well. See Kim J. Landsman
& Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyeringfor the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody
and Visitation Disputes Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE LJ. 1126, 1134-37 (1978).
39 Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also In re Spence-Chapin Adoption Service v. Polk, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436 (N.Y. 1971) (except when disqualified or displaced
by extraordinary circumstances, parents are generally best qualified to care for their
own children and therefore are entitled to do so).
40 GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 53-64.
41 JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1640-1981, at 13 (1988); Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilcsh, Criminal
Law: ProsecutingJuvenilesIn CriminalCourts, a Legal andEmpiricalAnalysis, 76J. GRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 439, 447 (citing Lee Teitelbaum & Leslie J. Hauers, Some Historical
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cision whether their offspring would survive at all. After a very
brief infancy, children began to contribute to the household or
farm. Their labor was their parents', and any outside income generated during minority also belonged to the father.42 When the
child became self-sufficient-wielding arms, learning a trade, marrying into another's family4 3-he or she moved out of the parent's
home and into the new household. Only at that time could the
"child" claim independent rights. Until that time, rights, as well as
possessions, were held in trust by the child's father.4 4 The child
owed the parent not only income, but also obedience. The father
had the duty to educate his children, provide religious instruction
and example 45 and support them financially. Discipline was carried out in the home-if the child was a problem, the remedy was
the chastisement of the father. 46 Alternatively, the parent could
force the child to enter the priesthood or military service or could
apprentice the child, collecting wages ex ante. Even very young
children came to the United States as indentured servants 4 7 or
served in the military as cabin boys or drummers. Orphaned children were wards of the parish, frequently growing up in workhouses in Dickensonian misery.
Perspectives on the Government Regulation of Children and Parentsin PoLIcv AND CONTROL:
STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 1 (Lee Teitelbaum & Adrian R. Rough,
eds. 1977)).
42 In medieval times, children of wealthy families were often sent to "foster" in
another home. In part this practice arose because of high infant mortality, as well as
to give both parents the freedom to perform their accustomed functions. See, e.g.,
PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (1962).
Less wealthy children, particularly boys, were apprenticed by age 10 to learn trades.
Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law 1706-1851, 73 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1038 (1979). They could also be indentured "solely because of the parents'
poverty." Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 435
(1983); Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAm. L. 677, 682-83
(1981-82).
43 In ancient Rome, adoption prevented the extinction of a bloodline. Zainaldin,
supra note 42, at 1041 (tracing the status of adoption back to its origins in early civilization). See also Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 74 (1956) (noting that "adoption is one of the oldest and most widely employed
of legal fictions") (citation omitted).
44 See generally Comment, The Rights of Children:A Trust Mode 46 FoRDHAM L. REV.
669 (1978).
45 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 5 (1985); Zainaldin, supra note
42, at 1052-68.
46 SUTrrON, supranote 41, at 11; Lawrence Sidman, The MassachusettsStubborn Child
Law, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33 (1972).
47 GROSSBERG, supra note 45, at 260-61.
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The idea that custody might be less of a right and more of a
trust developed during the mid-nineteenth century. By this time,
childhood itself was viewed as a separate stage of growth.4 8 Education outside the home was common, and most children no longer
worked in factories. A series of American cases suggested that if
parents were abusive, children could be placed elsewhere with
adoptive parents.4 9 Despite the possibility that the state might act
in parens patriae,50 the idea that children might have independent
rights took another hundred years to develop. As recently as
1953,51 the Supreme Court decided a case involving child custody
jurisdiction, noting that the parent's right to custody was a personal right more precious than alimony. The children's interest
was never mentioned at all.5 2
The first real suggestion of autonomy came in the 1960s, when
the Supreme Court indicated that school children had independent First Amendment rights.5" By the next decade, minor's rights
included the right to seek contraception and abortion without parental consent.5 4 A separate opinion in a Supreme Court case involving compulsory education suggested that minors might possess
48 ARiEs,

supra note 42, at 32.

49 Zainaldin, supra note 42, at 1061-64. The first statute to provide for adoption

was the Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children, MAss. REv. STAT. ch. 324 (1851).
Dickson, supra note 8, at 924 n.34. Before this, children were frequently "adopted"
through private legislation. Zainaldin, supra note 42, at 1043. This practice closely
resembles the legislative divorce, a detailed description of which appears in Lawrence
Friedman, Rites of Passage:Divorce Laws in HistoricalPerspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 65154 (1984).
50 The state began to replace the parent's educational function beginning in the
late nineteenth century with compulsory education laws. For a discussion of compulsory education, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226 (1972). See generally
Zainaldin, supra note 42, at 1050.
51 See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
52 Cf Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (child's domicile
plus that of one parent provides the basis for a custody action).
53 See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Bd., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (overturning a regulation by a local school board which prohibited students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court held that such a regulation
would be invalid where there was no indication beforehand that the prohibited conduct would reasonably lead school administrators to conclude that substantial disruption or material interference with school activities was likely to occur).
54 See Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (birth control); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979) (mature minors). For further discussion on this area, see generally Comment, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved-Religious Rights for Minor Children After
Danforth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (1978).
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independent religious rights as well.55
Meanwhile, states were changing their adoption and custody
laws. As children approached the age of reason, their preference
of custodians was to be an important factor.56 Frequently, in cases
involving termination of parental rights, states provided for guardians ad litem to represent the children's interests.5 7 A uniform law
domicile, the apmade the child's home state, not either parent's
58
propriate forum in nearly all custody cases.
The next decade saw still further extension of children's
rights. Now, according to some courts, minors could exert a privacy interest in their own homes and possessions.5 9 Statutes gave
them the right to independently seek medical care where they
might wish to keep the information private.' They could sue their
parents in tort for unintentional wrongs6 1 or those so "extreme and
outrageous" as to violate the essential bonds between parent and
child.

62

55 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56 See, e.g., Sanford Katz et al., EmancipatingOur Children - Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 F~Am. L.Q. 211, 216-17 (1973); Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor
Charges: EmancipatingChildren in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 239 (1992) (providing a full discussion of the range of options which become available to a person
upon reaching the age of majority).
57 For a discussion on the authority vested in a guardian ad litem and the desirability of providing separate representation to a child involved in family litigation, see
Stanley v. Fairfax County Dept. Social Servs., 395 S.E.2d 119 (Va. Ct. App. 1990);
Landsman & Minow, supra note 38 at 1129-34.
58 The UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, now adopted by Congress in
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1990).
59 See, e.g., In reScott K, 595 P.2d 105 (Cal. 1979) (parent of minor cannot consent
to search of minor's locked toolbox over objection of minor); State v. Douglas, 498
A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (to determine validity of consent to search
of minor's room, state must prove that defendant's mother possessed sufficient interest in the premises for which the search is authorized).
60 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(D) (Michie Supp. 1993) (conferring authority to consent to treatment to minor separated from custody of parent in certain specifically enumerated circumstances); WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 683 (2d ed. 1991); Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care:
The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973).
61 Abrogation of immunity began with automobile accident cases where there was
insurance, see Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wisc. 1963), but has spread to include
many household accidents as well. See generally Reid H. Hamilton, Comment, Defining
the Parent'sDuty After Rejection of Parent-ChildImmunity, 33 VAND. L. REv. 775 (1980).
Parental immunity apparently originated with the intentional tort case of Hewlett v.
George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891).
62 Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) (holding that a child could maintain
a tort action against a parent where tortious acts committed by parent evinced a total
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A few custody cases were now couched in terms of the child's
right to parental custody rather than the converse.6 3 However, in
adoption and termination cases, courts have extended the power
of natural parents. 6 4 As a result of the difficulty in proving permanent parental unfitness,6 5 coupled with the exponential growth of
the social work caseload,6 6 infertile couples have experienced increasing adversity in their effort to adopt children. The number of
potential adoptive parents has grown as more women have entered
the labor force and delayed pregnancy, but this tendency is
counteracted to some extent by technological progress in the area
of infertility. Probably the most important change in the supply of
children for the adoption market is the ready availability of
abortion.6 v
The 1990's have seen the first obvious attempts by children to
secure their own custodial placement.6" Although Gregory Kingsley was ultimately unsuccessful in divorcing his birth parents so that
abandonment of the parental relationship). See also Burnett v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105
(Or. 1978) (psychological and physical abuse leading to emotional harm held not to
present a viable cause of action).
63 See, e.g., Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794 (Va. 1972) (holding that evidence
showing tension between divorced natural parents leading to some reaction on part
of child was not sufficient to show that natural father's refusal to consent to adoption
of child by natural mother's husband was contrary to best interest of child without
proof that continuing relationship between child and natural father would be detrimental to child's welfare).
64 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating state statute which permitted state agency to terminate an unmarried father's parental rights without a hearing, while mandating such a hearing before termination of parental rights of divorced
parents or unmarried mother).
65 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that due process requires
state to prove parental unfitness in termination proceedings by the "clear and convincing" evidence standard); Lassiter v. Department Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(holding that while due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent
parents in all termination proceedings, such appointment is necessary in situations of
strong parental interest and weak governmental interest where the risk of error is
great).
66 This has occurred in part because of the increase in drug usage by parents and
in part because of the new abuse reporting requirements. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-380 (Michie 1993) (mandating investigation of any abuse complaint).
67 ADOPTION FAcTrOOK, supra note 8, at 96 (noting that in 1986, there were only
15.5 infant adoptions for every thousand abortions). The right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy was deemed to be protected by a constitutional right of privacy in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68 This practice, however, was not unheard of prior to this decade. For an earlier
example, see Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985) (minor Russian immigrant sought asylum in United States after his parents returned to Soviet Union).
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he could be adopted by his foster family, 69 Kimberly Mays did succeed in preventing visitation by her natural parents. ° However,
the third well-publicized case, In re Clausen,7 ' (the Baby Jessica
Case), illustrates the expanded power of natural parents, particularly unwed fathers, to withhold consent for adoption. Despite
more than two years' placement in a suitable adoptive home, Jessica was returned to her natural parents. This return was compelled despite the fact that it was Jessica's mother's deception that
created the loophole which voided adoption.7" In a Supreme
Court case, 7 3 a conclusive presumption of legitimacy ultimately
meant that an unwed natural father had no custodial rights to the
daughter he sired in an affair with a married woman. This was
another case in which the majority de-emphasized the rights of the
child as compared to the warring adults in her life.7 4
Thus courts, as well as legislators and economists, tend to
place greater emphasis on parental rights than on those of the chil69 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In this well publicized "parental divorce" case, the natural parents' parental rights were terminated
because of their neglect, but through state intervention rather than the initiation by
Gregory himself.
70 Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18,
1993). This rather bizarre case began when the Mays' and Twiggs' children were
switched at birth in a Florida hospital. The Twiggs' parental rights to Kimberly were
never severed. The mistake was not uncovered until the child raised by the Twiggs
became ill and died. Post-mortem examination revealed that the Twiggs were not the
parents of the child they had raised. Upon discovery of the identity of the child they
had parented, they attempted to establish a relationship with Kimberly, who was then
10 years old. Until that time, Kimberly had lived her entire life believing that Robert
Mays was her natural father.
71 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
]
72 The court ruled that "[w hile a child has a constitutionally protected interest in
family life, that interest is not independent of its parents' in the absence of a showing
that the parents are unfit." Id. at 652. The dissent argued that
The superior claim of the child to be heard in this case is grounded not
just in law, but in basic human morality.... This Court, by ignoring obvious issues concerning the welfare of the child and by focusing exclusively
on the concerns of competing adults, as if this were a dispute about the
vesting of contingent remainders, reduces the PKPA [Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act] to a robot of legal formality with results that Congress did
not intend.
I. at 670-71 (Levin, J., dissenting).
73 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
74 Id. at 132-34 (Stevens, J., concurring). This point was not missed by Milton
Regan in FAMILY LAW AND THE PuRsurr OF INrimAcv 135 (1993).

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:553

dren they purport to help.7 5 Mindful of this situation, we turn finally to revocation of consent for adoption. Again it will be seen
that courts show a pattern of concern for natural parents' rights
even when these conflict with those of the child.
HI.

Rights to Revoke Consent

Although some children enter the adoption market when
their parents are found unfit, the vast majority begin the process
after their parents voluntarily relinquish parental rights. This relinquishment procedure is also called "voluntary consent to adoption."7 6 Because there is no federal regulation or even federal
court review of child custody matters,7 7 each state has adopted its
own scheme. Accordingly, the result is the tremendous variation in
practice which is typical of family law.
Although adoption itself is a creature of statute,7" (which, consequently, compels each state to spell out the requirement of parental consent), the conditions for revocation are not always
explicit. In these states, the general consent law has been interpreted by judicial decisions. Some state adoption systems treat
consent for adoption much like an agreement to any other contract. In these states, once a parent has given valid consent, the
transaction becomes irrevocable.7 9 The rationale underlying the
system in these states, to the extent that such is available, is typified
0 In this case, the
by the Mississippi case of C. C.I. v. NaturalParents."
As the New York Court of Appeals stated in Bennett v. Jeffreys:
This shifting [of emphasis] reflects the more modem principle that a child
is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute
possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of constitutional magnitude.... Earlier cases... emphasized the right of the parent
superior to all others, to the care and custody of the child.
356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976) (citations omitted).
75

76 ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supranote 8, at 34. One must guard against the possibility

that consent may in some cases occur when a parent is threatened with termination of
rights in a child already in foster care. Conversation with Victor Flango, Center for
the Study of State Courts.
77 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S.Ct. 2209 (1992) (restating general principle
that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over family related causes of action).
78 See, e.g., Clarkson v. Bliley, 38 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1946); see generally Zainaldin,
supra note 42, at 1084.
79 The three states are: Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 210, § 2 (West 1987);
Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1990); C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d
220 (Miss. 1981); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.3 (1989).
80 398 So. 2d at 226 (unrestricted right to challenge surrender would result in
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Mississippi Supreme Court held that:
If a parent is allowed an unrestricted right to challenge his act of
surrender, uncertainty and confusion among adoption agencies
would undoubtedly result, making placement more difficult
which would be detrimental to the children involved as well as
to the public welfare. The statutory safeguards are themselves
sufficient to guard against a hastily made decision. 1
On the spectrum running from child's to natural parents' rights,
the next group of states lists short time periods for revocation, running from ten to thirty days after valid consent is given.8 2 This gives
some time for the natural parent to have a change of heart," but the
time period is short enough that neither the child nor the adoptive
parents will be greatly injured by revocation. As one state court put it
4
recently:
uncertainty and confusion among parties involved in adoption transaction, making
placement more difficult, to the detriment of children and the public welfare).
81 Id. at 225-26 (where the court determined that revocation was possible where
legal grounds supporting revocation were established by clear and convincing evidence). See also Golz v. Children's Bureau of New Orleans, Inc., 326 So.2d 865, 869
(La. 1976) (noting that where parents are fully aware of the content and effect of the
instrument the consent represents a free and deliberate exercise of will and must be
given full legal effect).
82 Eight states fit into this category. These are: Alaska, A. sKA STAT. § 25.23.070
(1991) (10 days if in best interests); Arkansas, AR. CODE ANN. § 9-9-209 (Michie
1993) (10 days); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 909 (Michie 1993) (10 days);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-26 (Michie 1991) (10 days); Kansas, Treiber v. Strong,
617 P.2d 114 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Maryland, MD. F m. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-311
(Michie 1991) (30 days); Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAws § 710.29 (West 1993) (20 days
prior to placement if in best interests of child); In re Blankenship, 418 N.W.2d 919
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); and Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 60.10 (West 1987)
(30 days if in best interests).
83 These changes of heart, or at least regret, are nearly inevitable for natural parents who relinquish their children. As an Indiana judge said in Johnson v. Cupp:
[S]uch consents [before the birth of the child] fail to allow for one of nature's strongest instincts. Who knows what the reaction will be of a
mother once she sees her baby? ... To deny the mother's natural desire to
keep her baby is in derogation of the purpose of our statute to preserve
the natural family relationship to the fullest extent possible.
274 N.E.2d 411 (Ind, Ct. App. 1971) (Buchanan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Regret occurs even when the fact that the child will be placed for adoption is known
before conception, as can be seen from recent surrogacy cases. See In re Baby M., 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (emphasizing birth mother's attachment to child as made evident from the moment of birth); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993)
(finding that woman who carried to term another woman's fertilized egg pursuant to
a surrogacy agreement had no parental rights to child).
84 Blankenship, 418 N.W.2d at 922 (citations omitted).
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After petitioners voluntarily released their child for adoption,
they did not have an absolute right to revoke the release for a
mere change of heart; the release could be set aside only in the
sound discretion of the probate judge, based on the best interests of the child. 5
Another group of states has very strict revocation requirements,
but does not make consent irrevocable. These state statutes provide
that there can be no revocation except in cases where consent was
obtained by fraud, duress or coercion. 6 In such cases, the consent
85 Id. The dissenting opinion in this case argued that before placement, petitions
for revocation are made prior to the creation of any parental rights in prospective
adoptive parents. As such,
the real parties in interest at the time of the rehearing are the State...
and the parents of the child. The state's interest is to see that the child's
basic needs are met. The parents' interest encompasses their obligation
to provide for the many needs of their child. The interests of the state and
the parents are therefore not necessarily in conflict and the judge's revocation of a parental release, if done within the time allowed by law, may
very well serve the interests of both parents and the state. Further, as no
rights of prospective adoptive parents have accrued at the time of the petition, a strong presumption must exist that at rehearing the child's best
interest would be served by allowing the parents to exercise their parental
rights and obligations.
Id. at 924 (Kirwan, J., dissenting).
86 These 20 states include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-14 (1992) (fraud or mistake); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112 (1992); Bailey v. Mars, 87 A.2d 388
(Conn. 1952) (fraud or coercion and in best interests); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.082 (West 1992) (fraud or duress); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (1993) (fraud,
duress or undue influence); In re Steve D.B., 723 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1989); Illinois, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 50, para. 11 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (within 12 months if fraud or duress);
Maine, In re David, 256 A.2d 583 (Me. 1969) (fraud, duress, mistake and final decree
not entered); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6) (a) (West 1992) (fraud); Missouri, Mo. Rv. STAT. § 453.056 (1986) (for cause); In re Mayernick, 292 S.W.2d 562
(Mo. 1956); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104 (1986) (reasonable time before accepted); Kellie v. Lutheran Fain. Serv., 305 N.W.2d 874 (Neb. 1981); Nevada, NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.080 (Michie 1993) (fraud); Blanchard v. Nevada Welfare Dep't,
542 P.2d 737 (Nev. 1975); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-16 (West 1992) (fraud,
duress or misrepresentation); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-17 (Michie 1993)
(involuntary or fraud before final decree); In re Kira M., 864 P.2d. 803 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-6 (1988) (misrepresentation); In rejulie,
334 A.2d 212 (R.I. 1975); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op.
1992) (before final decree if in best interests and fraud or duress); Johnson v. Horry
Co., 380 S.E.2d 830 (S.C. 1989); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 432(b) (1989)
(fraud, duress, coercion or undue influence); In re M. & G., 321 A.2d 19 (Vt. 1974);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Michie Supp. 1993) (before final order upon
fraud or duress; after placement only upon mutual consent); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.23.160 (1992) (within one year for fraud, duress, or incompetence); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (Michie 1992) (fraud or duress); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
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itself is involuntary. The extent to which such states look to the best
interests of children in rapid and certain placement depends upon
their definition of fraud, duress or coercion. If the states require a
standard similar to the commercial contracts definition of fraud, for
example, the defrauding conduct would have to induce performance,
would have to involve a material fact, and would have to be performed
by the other party to the transaction. 7 In adoption cases this is usually a state agency, but in direct placement cases it might be the adoptive parents themselves. This restrictive definition of the conditions in
which revocation is possible tends to value children's rights as opposed to those of the natural parents. In fact, those statutes that provide for no revocation except in cases of fraud and coercion have
restrictive definitions. For example, in Bailey v. Mars,"8 the court
noted that:
In the absence of fraud, coercion or other cause rendering the
mother's consent inoperative, the fact that after signing an
adoption agreement she has changed her mind and attempted
to withdraw her consent would not relieve her of her agreement. This would, however, become a very vital fact for the consideration of the Probate Court in determining whether under
all of the circumstances the adoption would be for the best interest of the child and so should be approved.8 9
Those states that permit revocation before the final decree lie on
the opposite end of the parents' rights spectrum.9 ° Since the adop§ 48.46 (West 1990) (involuntary consent); In re D.L.S., 332 N.W.2d 293 (Wis.
1983); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-109(d) (1988) (fraud); In reT.R. &J.S., 777 P.2d
1106 (Wyo. 1982) (duress).
87 Laidlow v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 195 (1817) (seller of tobacco witheld information that would have affected price buyer was willing to pay). See generally Anthony
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL SruD. 1
(1978); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,
ANN.

16J.L. & ECON. 67 (1973).
88 87 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1952). See also In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 835 (Idaho
1978) (holding that in an absence of fraud, duress or undue influence, "the general
rule favoring natural parents is inoperative and rather a judicial inquiry is triggered
[to determine] the best interest of the child").
89 Bailey, 87 A.2d at 392.
90 There are 12 "natural parent's rights" states. Note the relatively large amount of
appellate litigation surrounding these statutes, which is generally believed to be a
strong indication of uncertainty. For further examination of this principle, see
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984). The relevant states are: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-538 (West

1991); Webb v. Charles, 611 P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (upon parent's withdrawal); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(f) (West 1989) (before final decree if in
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tion process may take years, and usually must take at least six months,
bonds between the child and adoptive parent are almost certain to
form." In such states, a typical case will allow revocation in circumstances that would not suffice for revocation of a commercial contract.
For example, commercial contracts allow revocation for duress only
when there is a threat by the other party to the contract.9" The threat
must usually be of a severe physical sort that would clearly cause a
best interest of the child); Rhodes v. Shirley, 129 N.E. 60, 64 (Ind.1955); Iowa, IOWA
CODE ANN. § 660.7 (West 1981) (prior to final decree upon filing of consent to withdraw); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1991) (before
final judgment; not after two years thereafter except for ethnology); Montana, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-135(6) (1993) (before final placement if social services joins); In re
Termination of Parental Rights of L.A.C. & D.S.C., 718 P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986); New
Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:1 (1990); Adoption of Baby C., 480 A.2d
101 (N.H. 1984) (before final decree if in best interests); New York, N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 111 (McKinney 1994) (in best interests before final decree); Dickson v. Lascaris, 423 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1981); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11 (Michie
1993) (within 30 days of interlocutory decree); In re Kasim, 293 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1982); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.CODE § 14-15-08 (Michie 1991) (before final
decree if in best interest of child); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 109.312(2) (1993)
(before final decree; also may sign special form making consent irrevocable except
for fraud or duress); Small v. Andrews, 530 P.2d 540 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711 (1993) (prior to entry of final decree); and Texas,
TEX. FA . CODE ANN. § 16.06 (West 1986) (before final decree).
91 See, e.g., New York ex reL Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d
787 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971) (deciding that the interest of the newborn
would be best served by reuniting the child with the natural mother). See also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976), where the New York Court of Errors and
Appeals determined that:
The parent has a "right" to rear its child, and the child has a "right" to
be reared by its parent. However, there are exceptions created by extraordinary circumstances ...
The day is long past in this State ...when the right of a parent to the
custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are
present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the
child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right.
Id. at 281. The court further noted that "the child may be so long in the custody of
the nonparent that, even though there has been no abandonment or persisting neglect, by the parent, the psychological trauma of removal is grave enough to threaten
destruction of the child." Id. at 284.
Professor Lewis Komhauser of New York University Law School put it in a slightly
different context. He stated that their utility functions become interdependent, so
that the usual assumption of convex indifference curves no longer holds. Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REv. 349, 361 n.38 (1984).
92 See, e.g., Wartz v. Fleichman, 278 N.W.2d 266, 270-72 (Wis. 1978) (analyzing the
elements of duty in economic duress cases and the requisite elements to find a breach
of that duty); POSNER, 4th ed., supra note 1, § 4.7, at 113-17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1957) (setting forth the factors necessary for one to seek relief
under this theory).
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reasonable person to enter into a contract where he would not otherwise. The threat cannot be one of ordinary economic
circum94
stances.9 3 As the court said in C. C.L v. NaturalParents,
There is no doubt that John and Jane [pseudonyms] were not
free from emotions, tensions and inescapable anxieties which
resulted from her pregnancy during the time preceding their
marriage. No doubt almost any person situated as they were
would experience emotional trauma, but there is no law to the
effect that surrender of a child is valid only if done without such
distress. If such were the law almost any child surrender and
subsequent adoption decree could be attacked.95
In a natural "parent's rights" revocation state, duress may be the type
of hardship most single parents of unplanned children experience. 9 6
In between the two extremes are a number of states that allow
revocation before final placement or within longer time periods following consent. 7 Physical or psychological harm to children (and, at
the same time, to adoptive parents) occurs when natural parents are
permitted to revoke consent long after it has been given. In addition,
there will be other, market-driven effects. Although we join those
commentators and judges who have condemned lengthy revocation
periods due to the harm done to the parties involved,9 8 we concen93 See, e.g., Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1978) (listing
four factors before duress relieves contractual responsibility).
94 398 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1980).
95

I& at 224.

96 See, e.g., In re Susko, 69 A.2d 132 (Pa. 1949) (duress encountered by unwed
mother result of her brothers' accusations and hostility, not those of adoptive parents
or agency); cf. Meyers v. State, 183 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (unplanned pregnancy caused economic stress and embarrassment; also, due to peculiar circumstances, baby left by mother in phone booth held not to have been abandoned).
97 The remaining seven states belong in this category. They are California, CAL.
F~A. CODE § 8814.5 (West Supp. 1994) (120 days, or if waiver is executed in department); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 1990) (six months); In re
Custody of C.C.R.S., 1993 Colo. App. LEXIS 311 (divorce rules); Hawaii, HAw. REv.
STAT. § 578-2(0 (1989) (before final placement or in best interests); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 660.7 (West 1981) (prior to final decree upon filing of consent to withdraw);
Louisiana, LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 9-429 (West 1991) (if in best interests); Ohio, OHIO
Rxv. CODE ANN. § 310 (Baldwin 1992) (best interests); Morrow v. Family & Community Serv. of Catholic Charities, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 2, 5 (Ohio 1986) (discussing requirement that adoption consent form must be signed voluntarily), and Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-117 (1992) (before interlocutory order in best interests; before petition for any reason).
98 See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming guardianship petition to avert potential harm to the minor which was deemed
to be the likely result of continued parental custody); Henry H. Foster, Jr., Adoption
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trate here on another effect of revocation. Adoptive parents have
other sources of children. For example, they may resort to the black
market, where, if the price is high enough, certainty can be
purchased. Further, parents insecure about the stability of adoptions
in their own states can look for children from other states or foreign
countries. Because they are so eager to raise children, adoptive parents as a group tend to be exceptionally well informed. They will discover placements initiated in other states, and a quasi legal
intermediary mechanism flourishes. 99 Finally, although we have no
way to quantify this behavior, some parents may be so wary of the market, particularly if they have gone through one unsuccessful placement, that they withdraw altogether.
Alternatively, because of the natural parent's relative market
power, 0 0 she can behave opportunistically, extracting consumer surplus from the adoptive parents."' These additional payments might
range from concessions by the natural parent to visitation after adoption, 1° ' or listing in an adoption registry.1l ' Where legal, the payments might be more direct, such as greater reimbursement for
prebirth expenses or loss of income.
Because there are alternatives to in-state adoptions, we can make
and Child Custody: Best Interest of the Child, 22 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1972); GOLDSTEIN
supra note 14 at 53-64.
99 In many states, potential natural and adoptive parents can both advertise. ADOPTION FAcTBoOK, supra note 8, pp. 22-33 question 7, reveals 32 states. For examples of
such advertisements, see Id. at 121-22.
100 The number of adoptable children is very small. If she does not place with this
set of parents, it will be easy to secure another set to adopt her baby. The adoptive
couple, on the other hand, must start anew in its wait for a baby. For example, in
metropolitan Vancouver, 30 newborn children were available for adoption, while
1000 couples were approved and ready to receive an adopted child. Prichard, supra
note 2, at 343.
101 This particular element of human behavior is detained in Timothy J. Muris,
OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981); Brinig &
Crafton, supra note 6. For additional discussion on opportunism in the family law
arena, see Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,Divorce and Quasi-Rents, Or "I Gave Him the Best Years
of My Life," 16J. LEcAL STUD. 267 (1987).
102 See, e.g., In re Gregory B., 542 N.E.2d 1052, 1058-59 (N.Y. 1989) (acknowledging
the growing acceptance of open adoption, especially in the case of older children);
Curt Suplee, The Ties That Bind: The Case for "Open" Adoption, WASH. POST, July 17,
1990, at B4, col. 1 (reviewing LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION (1990)). See also
supra note 100.
103 This would permit contact with the child upon reaching adulthood. John M.
Stoxen, Comment, The Best of Both "Open" and "Closed" Adoption Worlds: A Callfor the
Reform of State Statutes, 13 J. LEGIS. 292 (1986).
ET AL.,
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several economic predictions about the adoption market as it is affected by the transactions cost of consent revocation. If natural parents find it relatively easy to revoke consent, there should be fewer instate adoptions because the adoptive parents do not want to accept
the increased risk.' °4 There should also be more foreign adoptions
and more adoptions from out of state. This last consequence is reflected in the ratio of adoptions in-state (as revealed by court data) to
the number of children born in the state whose birth certificates are
altered after adoption (revealed in data kept by state bureaus of vital
statistics). In fact, some states are net importers of adoptees (the numerator) while others export them (denominator exceeds
numerator).
IV. EmpiricalResults: Adoption and Revocation Statutes
In order to begin an empirical analysis of the effect of adoption revocations on the number of adoptions, it was first necessary
to categorize state revocation statutes. The author examined each
state statute involving consent and revocation. When the statute
provided a specific time period, this value was entered. Other
states had no numerical provision, but language such as "in cases
of fraud or duress." Some states had no statutory provision, but
had case law providing relevant standards. Each state received a
numerical "score" ranging from 0 to 500.105 The set of resulting
scores, with sources for the standards, follows as Table I:
104 See, e.g., Dickson, supranote 8, at 917, where the author notes that "existing law
and agency practices place overly burdensome risks on adopters and inappropriately
fail to consider their interests even after the adoption process is underway."
105 States explicitly disallowing revocation received a score of zero. See supra note
79 for the list of these states. States with explicit revocation periods were given the
value of the length of the period. See supra note 82, (list of states with short periods),
and supra note 97 (longer periods). If withdrawal of consent is allowed before placement with the adoptive family, or the statute allowed withdrawal only if there was
fraud and coercion, the state was awarded a 50, as in the states listed supra note 86. If
withdrawal is allowed before the final decree in the best interests of the child, the
value was 75. See supra note 97 for the inventory of the states fitting this criteria. If a
parent can withdraw consent any time before the final adoption decree, the value is
360, and the list appears at supranote 97. If the parent may withdraw consent at any
time, I awarded a score of 500.
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State
Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas
California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Illinois

Indiana
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Statute

Time Period and
Grounds
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Cases

before final decree if
fraud, mistake; not
after 1 year after final
decree unless
kidnapped
within 10 days or after
Alaska Stat.
10 days & before final
§ 25.23.070 (1991)
decree if in best
interests
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-538 upon parent's
Webb v. Charks, 611
P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct.
(West 1991)
withdrawal
App. 1980)
Ark Code Ann. § 9-9- within 10 days
209 (Michie 1993)
Cal. Fam. Code
120 days; or waiver of
§ 8814.5 (West Supp. right to revoke
executed in
1994)
department
In re Custody of
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
not after 6 months
C.C.RS., 1993 Colo.
§ 19-5-203 (West
App. LEXIS 311
1990)
none without fraud or Bailey v. Mars, 87 A.2d
Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 17a-112 (1992)
388 (Conn. 1952)
coercion and in best
interests
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, within 10 days
§ 909 (Michie 1993)
none except where
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 63.082 (West 1992) fraud or duress
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8- within 10 days
26 (1991)
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 578- before placemient or
in best interestts
2(0 (1989) 1
Idaho Code § 16-1504 none without fraud,
Petition of Steve D.B.,
723 P.2d 829 (Idaho
(1993)
duress, or und ue
influence
1989)
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 50, none; except Aithin
para. 11 (Smith-Hurd 12 months of consent
if fraud or durtess
1993)
Ind. Code Ann. § 31- before final de cree if Rhodes v. Shirly, 129
N.E. 60, 64 (Ind.
in best interestts
3-1-6(0 (West 1989)
Ala. Code § 26-10A-14
(1992)

1955)

Iowa

Iowa Code Ann.
§ 660.7 (West 1981)

Kansas

no statute

Kentucky

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 199.540 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merril 1991)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9-429 (West 1991)

Louisiana

prior to final dlecree
upon filing of consent
to withdraw
no withdrawal

before final ju dgment;
no attack after 2 years
except for ethinology
if in best inter ests

Treiber v. Strong, 617
P.2d 114 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1980)

Score
50
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Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi
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no statute only if
fraud duress mistake
and final decree not
entered
Md. Fam. Law Code
Ann § 5-311 (Michie
1991)
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
Laws ch. 210, § IlA
(West 1987)
Mich. Comp Laws
§ 710.29 (West 1993)

In re David, 256 A.2d
583 (Me. 1969)

withir 30 calendar
days
none

withir 20 days, prior
to plaacement; best
interests
within 10 days any
Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 259.24(6) (a) (West reason; afterwards for
fraud
1992)
Miss. Code Ann. § 93- none
17-9

In re Blankenship, 418
N.W.2d 919 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988)

C.C.. v. Natural
Parents,398 So. 2d 220
(Miss. 1981)
In re Mayernick, 292
S.W.2d 562 (Mo.
1956)

Missouri

Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 453.050 (1986)

for cause at the
court's discretion

Montana

Mont. Code Ann.
§ 40-6-135(6) (1993)

before final placement In re Termination of
if social services joins parental Rights of
L.A.C. &D.S.C., 718
P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986)

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43104(1986)

within reasonable time Kellie v. Lutheran Fan.

Nevada

Nev. Rev.
§ 127.080
1993)
New Hampshire N.H. Rev.
§ 170-B:1

Stat.
(Michie
Stat. Ann.
(1990)

before accepted

Sew., 305 N.W.2d 874
(Neb. 1981)
none except for fraud Blanchard v. Nevada
Welfare Dept., 542 P.2d
737 (Nev. 1975)
before final decree if Adoption of Baby C.,
480 A.2d 101 (N.H.
in best interests
1984)

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-16 none except on court
(West 1992)
finding of fraud,
duress,
misrepresentation
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-7- before final decree if
New Mexico
involuntary or fraud
38(F) (Michie 1993)
in best interests
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
New York
before final decree
§ 111 (McKinney
1994)
within 30 days or
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48entry of interlocutory
11 (Michie 1993)
decree
North Dakota
N.D. Cent. Code § 14- before final decree if
in best interests
15-08 (Michie 1991)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. in best interests
Ohio
§ 310 (Baldwin 1992)
NewJersey

Oklahoma

Ok. Stat. tit. 10
§ 60.10 (West 1987)

within 30 days if in
best interests

In re Kira M.,864 P.2d
803 (N.M. App. 1993)
Dickson v. Lascaris, 423
N.E.2d 361 (N.Y.
1981)
In re Kasim, 293 S.E.2d
247 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982)

Morrow v. Family &
Community Serv. of
Catholic Charities, Inc.,
504 N.E.2d 2 (1986)
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Oregon

before final decree, or
only on fraud or
duress if sign
statement
prior to entry of final
Pennsylvania
23 Pa. Cons. Stat.
decree
§ 2711 (1993)
Rhode Island
R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7- if misrepresentation,
under general
6 (1988)
procedures
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7- before final decree if
in best interests and
1720 (Law Co-op
fraud or duress
1992)
within 6 months of
South Dakota
S.D. Codified Laws
final decree only
Ann. § 25-6-4 (1993)
Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 109.312(2) (1993)

Tenn. Fain. Code
Ann. § 36-1-117
(1992)

Texas

Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 16.06 (West 1986)
Utah Code Ann § 78- irrevocable
30-4.3 (1989)
Vt. Stat. Ann. § tit. 15 only if fraud, duress,
coercion or undue
§ 432(b) 1989)
influence
Va. Code Ann. § 63.1- before final order
upon proof of fraud
225 (Michie 1993)
or duress; after
placement upon
mutual consent
before court approval,
Wash. Rev. Code
or within one year for
§ 26.23.160 (1992)
fraud or duress,
incompetence
only upon fraud or
W.Va. Code § 48-4-5
duress; within 10 days
(Michie 1992)
if nonconforming
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.46 within one year if new
evidence; must be
(West 1990)
voluntary
upon fraud (code) or
Wyo, Stat. § 1-22duress (opinion)
109(d) (1988)

Vermont
Virginia

Washington

West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Small v. Andrews, 530
P.2d 540 (Or. 1975)

In reJulie, 334 A.2d
212 (R.I. 1975)
Johnson v. Hory Co.,
380 S.E.2d 830 (S.C.
1989)
In re Termination of
ParentalRights over
jMJ, 379 N.W.2d 816
(S.D. 1985)

before interlocutory
order in best interests;
before petition for any
reason
before final decree

Tennessee

Utah
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In re M&G, 321 A.2d
19 (Vt. 1974)

In re D.L.S., 332
N.W.2d 293 (Wis.
1983)
In re ParentalRights of
T.. &JS., 777 P.2d
1106 (Wyo. 1982)

The data from Table I provide the basis for an empirical test of
the effect of consent revocation legislation on the number of adoptions in states."0 6 The dependent variable is the number of adoptions/thousands of households in the state.10 7 Obviously other things
106 The number of adoptions is located in ADOPTION FACfBOOK, supra note 8, at 8081 (tbl. I).
107 The number of households appears in the UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 45, 455 (1990) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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beside revocation legislation (REVOKE) affect the number of adoptions that occur in states. The number of babies that are available for
adoption changes with alternatives to adoption such as abortion or
single parenthood. Unmarried women are more inclined to bear children as opposed to abort them if single parenthood becomes socially
and if they receive adequate public assistance. The
acceptable'
monthly rate for Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC) is therefore
included as a controlling variable, as is the number of abortions in the
state for 1987 (ABORTS).' 0 9 Factors influencing the desire to adopt
include couples' income (MEDINC)," 0 and their infertility, which is
reflected in the number of married women in the labor force
(WOMENL). i n The results of robust regression analysis" 2 are reported below as Table 11:113
For example, A World Without Fathers: The Struggle to Save the Black Family, NEwsAug. 30, 1993, at 16, suggests that for the African-American segment of the
population, single parenthood is becoming the norm rather than the exception. See
also Dickson, supra note 8, at 919 n.17.
109 This number is reported in the ADovrION FACTBOOK, supra note 8, at 96-97 (tbl.
9).
110 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 107.
108

WEEK,

111 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

(1987). Rates of infertility and deferred child bearing have
increased dramatically in recent decades. Suplee, supra note 102, at B4. The assortment of problems confronted by adoptive parents is discussed in Dickson, supra note
8. Additional discussion of the relationship between infertility and the age of women
appears Id. at 931 n.88 (citing RESOLVE, INC., WHEN YOU'RE WISHING FOR A BABYMY'HS AND FACTS (1989)); and at 918 n.5 (citing INFERTILrl. MEDICAL, EMOTIONAL
AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 3 (M. Mazor & H. Simons, eds. 1984)). The connection
between the number of women in the labor market and the increase in infertility has
been noted by both Dickson, supra note 8, at 931-32; and Landes & Posner, supra note
1.
112 Robust analysis, rather than ordinary least squares, is appropriate where, as
here, there is not a normal distribution of errors. This is determined by the BeraJarque joint test of skewness and kurtosis, as described in GEORGE C. JUDGE ET AL.,
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECONOMETRICS 890-92 (2d ed. 1988).
As opposed to ordinary least squares, robust regressions consider the distance between the observed data and the median of the estimated line (least absolute errors).
This procedure avoids the errors produced when very large data points change the
mean. The regressions were run on the econometrics program SHAZAM©, as described in KENNETH J. WHITE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ECONOMETRICS 367-73 (2d ed. 1988).
113 R-SQUARE between observed and predicted = 0.2082. CHI-SQUARE =
499.1945 with 2 degrees of freedom.
MONTHLY LABOR REPORTS
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VARIABLE

ESTIMATED

STANDARD

T-RATiO

PARTIAL

STANDARDIZED

ELs"mcrry

NAME

COEFFICIENT

ERROR

43 DF

CORR.

COEFFICIENT

AT MEANS

UNWEDBI
AFDC
WOMENL
ABORTS
REVOKE
MEDINC
CONSTANT

-0.13409E-04
0.50740E-03
-0.59027E-02
0.31091E-05
-0.58855E-03
-0.68679E04
3.6538

-2.1935
1.7228
-1.1405
1.1528
-2.3314
-8.4055
9.7130

-0.3172
-0.55814
0.2541
0.14949
-0.1713 -0.64414E-01
0.29971
0.1731
-0.12138
-0.3350
-0.7884
-0.61689
0.8288 0.00000E+00

0.61129E-05
0.29452E-03
0.51756E-02
0.26970E-05
0.25244E-03
0.81707E-05
0.37618

-0.17460
0.14812
-0.2482
0.72186E-01
-0.38421E-01
-1.5252
2.7260

In the regression, significant coefficients are indicated in bold face.
The conclusion is that the number of unwed births, the revocation
statutes, and the median income are the best predictors of the
number of adoptions in a state.
V.

Conclusion

Assuming that the uncertainty introduced by relaxed revocation statutes influences the number of adoptions, the immediate
question for legislators is whether the focus on the rights of natural
mothers is appropriate. Once the state guarantees that the birth
mother's consent is voluntarily made, a short revocation period will
suffice. As long as the emphasis is truly on "the best interests of the
child," the exact wording of the statute makes little difference.
There is room for future analysis of the adoption system. One
topic that has already caused some concern, both in the context of
surrogate motherhood1 14 and more traditional adoptions, 115 is the
proper role of the intermediary. 6 Many markets improve with the
presence of a middleman who can locate interested buyers and
114

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.859 (West 1993), subjecting those who ar-

range surrogate contracts to criminal sanction of up to five years imprisonment and
up to $50,000.00 fine.
115 The following cases and statutes have defined the duties and responsibilities of
intermediaries in the context of standard adoptions: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904
(Michie 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1002, 32-1009 (Michie 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN.

ch. 210, § IlA (West 1987); N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 9:3-39, -54 (West 1993); In re

Adoption of a Child by N.P., 398 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979); In reAdoption of Vincent, (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1993), 19 F.L.R. 1488; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-215, 63.1220.1 (Michie 1991).
116 See, e.g., Anne Taylor Fleming, OurFascinationwith Baby M., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,

1987, (Magazine), at 33 (discussing author's visit with attorney who acted as intermediary in that case); Avi Katz, Comment, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws,
20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1986); HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 623-24 (2d ed. 1988).
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sellers, overcoming information problems. 1 7 The adoption market, however, is characterized by extremely vulnerable buyers and
sellers,1 1 who are easily exploited by the unscrupulous. Recently,
courts have allowed an action for "wrongful adoption," awarding
damages in tort where agencies fraudulently misrepresent a child's
health or genetic history. 1 19 This seems preferable to allowing
adoptive parents to return the children to21 county agencies,120 or
enacting still further layers of regulation.1
117

See, e.g, Dickson, supra note 8, at 921 n.23 (citing George Stigler, The Economics of

Information, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968)); ARMEN A. ALCHIAN &
WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 48-50 (3d ed. 1983).

118 See, e.g., Dickson, supra note 8, at 921. Dickson notes that "[aldopters . .. are
becoming increasingly vulnerable to fraud and mistreatment because of the combined effects of the competitive market for adoptable children and the emotional
burden of infertility." Id.; see also supra note 117, for sources cited by Dickson in
arriving at this conclusion.
119 See, e.g., Dickson, supra note 8, at 955-64.
120 See, e.g., Dianne Klein, "Special" Children: Dark Past Can Haunt Adoptions, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 1988, at 1, 32 (discussing the problems caused by failure of adoption
agencies to inform adoptive parents of a child's troubled history); Andrea Sachs,
When the Lullaby Ends; Should Adoptive Parents Be Able to Return Unwanted Children?,
TIME, June 4, 1990, at 82 (1000 returns, or two percent of all adoptions including
those of related children).
121 Regulations requiring full disclosure are advocated by Dickson, supra note 8, at
954-55.

